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| Operation and maintenance budgets for flood controls |
O&M Budgets: the new corruption frontier
Well-built assets still fail without operation & maintenance. In drainage systems, annual desilting, trash rack cleaning, weed control, lubricant changes, and electrical checks keep systems alive. When O&M lines are neglected or never maintained, risk accumulates quietly until the first major storm. Global practice recognizes O&M as a distinct contract type (e.g., management/O&M/O&M PPP contracts), with specific deliverables and service-level agreements; however, many adaptation projects celebrate commissioning and overlook the decade that follows (World Bank PPP/O&M notes) (PPP Knowledge Lab).
Corruption risks migrate into O&M in three ways:
- Chronic under-budgeting so emergency direct awards become the norm (see Chapter 4).
- Ghost maintenance: invoices for pump servicing with no actual work; dredging measured in paperwork, not in cubic meters removed.
- Consumables capture: fuel, lubricants, and spare parts “leak” from depots; inventory controls are weak.
These are not hypotheticals. In Mumbai, the city has long struggled with the reliability of pumping stations and pre-monsoon desilting to keep flood-prone junctions dry. In 2024–2025, the city reported upgrades and fined contractors after early-monsoon flooding exposed failures in pump operations (Times of India, 2025a, 2025b). To better understand the cost of these failures, consider translating the fines into operational terms: for each dollar fined, calculate the number of pump-hours lost. Such a metric could more vividly reveal the operational cost of negligence than currency alone. The details differ city to city, but the pattern rhymes: poor maintenance + early heavy rain = water up to the axles (The Times of India, indiatimes.com).
Case Study: Metro drainage upgrades —bottlenecks and siltation neglect (India & Bangladesh)
Mumbai, India—one weak link can drown a city
Mumbai’s stormwater network is a blend of historic open drains (nullahs – watercourses or artificial water channels), covered culverts, tidal outfalls, and pumping stations. The system’s vulnerabilities are well-documented in city and academic reports, including tidal backflow at outfalls, silted nullahs, construction debris blocking flows, and pumps that fail under load (Gupta, 2009; UDRI, 2020). Mumbai illustrates how, even after catastrophic floods in 2005 and strong recommendations for upgrades (MCGM, 2006), failures in annual, verified maintenance and operational discipline continue to create life-safety risks. This case directly demonstrates how lapses in O&M and climate-proofing, rather than just technical design, lead to repeated disaster risk under extreme weather (UDRI, 2020; Times of India, 2025a; 2025b). (nidm.gov.in)
In 2025, Mumbai’s civic body (BMC) reduced the number of deployed monsoon pumps from 482 to 417, citing drainage upgrades, and also touted the pre-monsoon desilting of key rivers and nullahs (Times of India, 2025a). Yet, early floods led to fines for contractors at several pumping stations where operations were deemed negligent (Times of India, 2025b). This reinforces the central message that climate integrity depends not just on infrastructure quantity but on documented O&M and system redundancy. By highlighting Mumbai's experience, this case study shows why actual maintenance records and operational transparency—not assurances—are critical for flood resilience. Citizens should insist on pre-monsoon O&M logs, run-time data, generator test records, and before-and-after silt volumes, all published in machine-readable form (UDRI, 2020; OCP/CoST practice; udri.org).
Dhaka, Bangladesh—encroached khals, clogged outfalls, and plans without plumbing
Dhaka’s drainage system relies on khals (canals), wetlands, and the surrounding river system. Rapid urbanization has narrowed or blocked many khals; solid waste and silt reduce capacity; and some outfalls lack pumps or backflow protection (GFDRR, 2015; DWASA Drainage Master Plan, 2016). The city’s own planning documents acknowledge the challenge of maintaining urban wetlands, water bodies, khals, and drainage facilities, which must be coordinated across agencies and linked to weather forecasts and flood mapping (GFDRR, 2015; DWASA, 2016) (gfdrr.org).
Recent technical work is advancing urban flood forecasting and improving hydrodynamic modeling for Dhaka, recognizing that climate-intensified extremes necessitate smarter operations, not just concrete measures (Preprints/MIKE+, 2024; ResearchGate preprint, 2025). However, forecasting cannot substitute for sustained desilting, encroachment control, and operational and maintenance (O&M) funding. Studies of Dhaka’s drainage repeatedly identify siltation and solid-waste congestion as major drivers of waterlogging (Asaduzzaman et al., 2014, summary; SciSpace PDF). Put simply: if you do not keep the khals open, you drown (GFDRR, 2015; DWASA, 2016; Asaduzzaman et al., 2014). Economically, waterlogging in Dhaka is estimated to cost the city approximately USD 1 billion in annual GDP losses, underscoring the economic imperative of effective desilting practices (estimates need confirmation).
Citizen checks in both cities are similar:
Demand lists of flood-prone spots and the specific works/O&M done there before monsoon;
ask for silt removed (m³) vs. contracted m³ per nullah;
request pump run-time logs, generator test certificates, and photos of cleared outfalls;
insist that data be machine-readable, not a “PDF trap” (CoST/OC4IDS, 2024–2025).
Case Study: River dike failures in the Philippines
The Philippines is investing heavily in flood control, but the 2024–2025 period exposed systemic quality failures. The Commission on Audit (COA) filed multiple fraud audit reports on flood-control projects in Bulacan and elsewhere, flagging substandard, overpriced, or non-existent works; media documented collapsed dike sections and “ghost” projects; Senate inquiries heard testimony about kickbacks and low-quality materials (GMA, 2025; ABS-CBN, 2025a; Reuters, 2025; AP, 2025). (GMA Network)
Illustrative incidents reported publicly in 2025 include:
- Collapsed dike sections in Antique and Oriental Mindoro amid strong flows during the southwest monsoon and Storm Opong, with local officials and residents alleging poor workmanship and substandard materials (Inquirer, 2025; Brigada, 2025; ABS-CBN, 2025b; YouTube news reports). (Inquirer News)
- A dike in Nasugbu (Batangas) failed within two years of completion, raising questions about design loads, compaction, and concrete strength (GMA, 2025b). (GMA Network)
- COA fraud findings: multiple riverbank/flood-control projects paid in full but found mislocated, with exposed steel and unsuitable materials, or alleged to be non-existent—now under Ombudsman review (GMANetwork, 2025a; Manila Times, 2025; Inquirer, 2025b).
From an engineering-integrity perspective, the failure modes implied by these reports are classic:
- Insufficient compaction of embankment fills leads to settlement and cracking, opening pathways for piping and head erosion (USACE, 2000). To prevent such issues, it is recommended to conduct compaction tests at a frequency of one test per 500 cubic meters of fill, ensuring consistent soil density and integrity across the structure.
- Untested/under-strength concrete or inadequate cover on rebar → early spalling and loss of section under repeated wetting (USACE, 2000).
- Missing filter/drain layers and toe protection → under-seepage and slope sloughing, especially under prolonged high flow (USACE, 2000).
- Rushed timelines to “beat” fiscal deadlines → poor curing, skipped tests, and acceptance of incomplete structures before typhoon season (World Bank, 2014).
The governance lessons mirror Chapters 3–4: publish designs and “As-Built” drawings, show materials test certificates, geotag progress photos, require independent lab sampling, enforce defects-liability periods, and publish O&M plans for river training (CoST/OC4IDS; OCP). Citizens and local universities can help verify whether what’s on paper is on the riverbank (CoST, 2024–2025).

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